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The paper introduces  a framework  for  analyzing the impacts  of land  control  programs on
agricultural  production  under heterogenous  land  qualities,  heterogenous  production  technolo-
gies and imperfect  capital markets.  It shows that  the introduction  of diversion  programs  tends
to benefit  land  owners  while  harming  operators.  Moreover,  it tends  to increase  the separation
of  land  ownership  and  operation  and increase  concentration  among operators.  Diversion  pro-
grams  tend  to  raise  land  prices  less  than  proportional  to  the  increases  in  rental  rates.  They
encourage  the adoption  of  yield increasing  technologies,  and may  also  encourage  adoption  of
cost  reducing  technologies  when  credit  is a binding constraint.  Participation  in voluntary  gov-
ernment  programs  tends  to  be  greater  in  regions  with  higher  costs,  less  efficient  marginal
technology  and less  efficient  marginal land.
The purpose  of  this paper  is  to deter-
mine  the  theoretical  distributional  im-
pacts  of  two  particular  policies-acreage
setasides or land-retirement  programs and
associated  subsidies  or  deficiency  pay-
ments.  The  evaluation  of  the  effects  of
these  policies  on the  distribution  of agri-
cultural  production  takes  place  within  a
framework  sufficiently  general to  accom-
modate  both  mandatory  and  voluntary
governmental  programs.  Producers  are
required to divert or setaside some portion
of their available  land  (asset control)  and
may  receive,  as  an  incentive,  a  subsidy,
diversion,  or  deficiency  payment.  Such
policy  variables  have  been  the  key  ele-
ments  in  governmental  programs  related
to land  use in the United  States.
A  number  of  recent  studies  have  ad-
dressed  the  distributional  impacts  of  ag-
ricultural  land  control  and  subsidy  pro-
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grams on small- and medium-size farmers.
Unfortunately,  little  in  the  way  of  con-
crete  results-conceptual  or  empirical-
has been  advanced.  Much  of  this work  is
summarized by  Gardner  who argues that
"The  current  state  of  affairs,  in  sum,  is
that agricultural economists have not been
able  convincingly  to  establish  a  connec-
tion  one  way  or  another  between  policy
and the structure  of agricultural  produc-
tion  ... "  (p.  842).  Although  much  dis-
agreement  seems  to  exist  with  regard  to
the  distributional  effects  of  general  agri-
cultural  policies,  a  conventional  wisdom
has  emerged  on  aggregate  policy  effects
and  the  principal  characteristics  of  U.  S.
agriculture.  This  conventional  wisdom
stems  from  the  classic  piece  of  Schultz
(1945). In Schultz's work, the emphasis was
on  labor;  but,  in  subsequent  work  by
Schultz  (1953),  differences  in  rates  of re-
turn  to  resources  for different  producers
were  attributed  to  differences  in  land
quality,  endowments  of  inputs,  human
capital, and wealth controlled by individ-
ual  producers-the  key  resource  con-
straints  in  programming  models.  In addi-
tion, following the work of Schultz (1953),
both Johnson and Cochrane have suggest-Western Journal of Agricultural Economics
ed asset  fixity, competitiveness,  and rapid
technological  change  as  other  character-
istics  of  principal  importance.  The  limi-
tations of credit availability  for producers
of different size classes should also be rec-
ognized explicitly.  As  empirical  evidence
reported by Baker, Quinn, and Riboud has
shown,  rural credit markets must be treat-
ed  as  imperfect.  Any  attempt  to  analyze
the distributional effects of policy requires
a specification  of all these structural char-
acteristics.
The  above  studies  have  been  under-
taken over the post-World  War  II period.
The empirical evidence over this same pe-
riod  shows  that  redistribution  within the
agricultural production sector has, indeed,
been  dramatic.  The  average  size  of  pro-
duction  units increased  from  216 acres  in
1950  to  390 acres  in  1976,  while  the av-
erage value per acre moved over the same
period  from  $43  to  $244  in  1967  dollars.
The major  demand for farmland  still em-
anates  from  farmers  expanding  their  op-
erations (Carter and  Johnston).
In  addition  to  recognizing  credit  mar-
kets in  assessing the distributional  impact
of agricultural  policy, the land  and rental
markets for land must be given special at-
tention.  The  rapid  appreciation  in  land
values  during  the  1970s  is  much  of  the
basis  for another  emerging  phenomenon,
namely,  the  disruption  of  the  traditional
unity  between  ownership  and  operation
of  farm  units  (Carter  and  Johnston).
Hence, the rental market for land  cannot
be ignored in  any serious investigation  of
the distributional impacts  of  U.S.  agricul-
tural  policy.
In this setting, the evaluation of govern-
mental  intervention  in  terms  of  output
markets only,  is  grossly  inadequate.  Gov-
ernmental policies impinge directly on as-
set as well as flow  markets for both inputs
and outputs.  In general,  the distributional
consequences  depend  on  the  ownership,
utilization,  quality,  and  technology  asso-
ciated with the assets. For the formulation
developed in this paper, the distributional
implications  of  acreage  setasides  and  di-
version  payments are drawn through  out-
put markets and land and rental markets,
noting the limitations of rural credit mar-
kets  and  the importance  of technological
change.  The heterogeneous  nature  of ag-
ricultural  production  is  admitted  by  al-
lowing  variations  in  land  quality  across
producers  as well  as  for a particular  pro-
ducer.'  A  major benefit of the formulation
advanced  in  this paper  is that it provides
a  theoretical  justification  and  analytical
framework for qualitatively evaluating the
implications  of  mathematical  program-
ming models  that have  been used  widely
by  agricultural  economists  (Heady  and
Srivistava; McCarl  and  Spreen).
We  begin  our  analysis  with  a  specifi-
cation  of  the basic  model  of  agricultural
production  in section 1. Section 2 contains
the  basic  model  formulation  with  diver-
sion and acreage-control  policies. A  useful
simplification  of the  criterion  function  is
presented  in  section  3  which  shows  that
the overall gains for a particular  farm can
be decomposed  into gains  from operation
or land  utilization and  gains from wealth
in  landholdings.  In  section  4,  we  move
from  the  microeconomic  foundations  of
the  mathematical  programming  sector
model  to the embodied  theoretical  aggre-
gation  process.  Based  on  the  aggregation
of  individual  farm  behavior  to  market-
level relationships under fixed technology,
we  investigate  the  aggregative  effects  of
changes  in  diversion  policies,  the  special
case of cost-reducing technologies, and the
distributional  effects  on  landowners.  The
assumption  of fixed  technology  is relaxed
in  section  5  where  the trade-off  between
land transactions  and  capital-good  invest-
ments  is  introduced.  In  section  6,  some
As  we  shall see  later,  land  qualities  vary  not  only
across different  areas  of the nation but also on  land
controlled by a particular producer,  especially  larg-
er  scale  producers.  This  observation  is particularly
relevant  in assessing the distributional  effects of the
national  farm  policy program.
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concluding  remarks  summarize  the prin-
cipal  results of the paper.
1.  Putty-Clay  Agricultural Production
In  general,  the  distributional  implica-
tions of agricultural policy depend on farm
size,  land quality, equity,  capital, and ex-
isting technology.  Assume  an agricultural
sector consisting of  I farms denoted by in-
dexes  i  =  i,  ... ,  I.  To  reflect  the  distri-
bution  of  farm  size  and  land  quality,  let
Li= (Lil,  ... ,  Lij)'  represent  acreage  en-
dowments  of qualities  j =  1,  . . . , J  owned
by farm i at the beginning of a production
period.2 Before  implementing  production
decisions,  a  producer  may  choose  either
to buy additional land or sell existing land.
Thus, let  AL i =  (ALi,  . . .,  AL ij)'  be a  vec-
tor representing  the change in ownership
of  various  land  qualities  (ALij  >  0  repre-
sents  net  purchases  and  ALij  < 0  repre-
sents  net  sales).  In  addition,  the  farmer
may choose  to augment  his land-holdings
for the duration of the production period
by  renting  additional  land  from  external
sources  represented  by  Zi = (Zi,  . . .,  Zi)
where  Zij  < 0 corresponds  to leasing  some
of his own land to another  farmer.
In this context the vector,  Ai, of acreages
of various  qualities  utilized  by  farm  i  in
crop  production  must  satisfy  the  Land
Utilization Constraint
0  < A i < Li + ALi  + Zi  (1)
2 As we shall show,  this feature allows an examination
of  the  impact  associated  with  diverting  only  the
most unproductive  lands.  As numerous  authors have
noted,  average yields tend to increase when acreage
restrictions  are  imposed  (Weisgerber).  As  a  result
of acreage setaside  or control programs  within U.S.
agriculture,  Weisgerber  estimates  that  the  com-
bined effects of land selection  within farms and the
differential  impact  among  areas  cause  land  with-
drawn  from  production  to be,  on the  average,  80-
90 percent  as productive  as  the land  utilized.  This
has been referred  to in the literature as  "slippage";
it  is often  computed  on the basis  of past  data  and
is assumed  in policy  impact analysis.  In our model
such  slippage rates  are treated  endogenously.
and, of course, the farmer can neither sell
nor lease to another farmer more land than
is  actually  owned-the  Land Sale  Con-
straint and the Land Rental Constraint,
AL i > -Li (2)
and
Zi  >  -L i - ALi. (3)
To  consider  the  distribution  of  capital
stock and technology  in the industry, sup-
pose  there  are  So  types  of  existing  tech-
nologies  in the industry, and  every farm's
existing  technology,  S O, may  be  classified
into  one of these  types  denoted by  s = 1,
. . .,  So. The technology  type thus specifies
the  complete  machinery  complement,
structures,  etc.  In addition,  with the  new
production  period,  S1  - So,  new  technol-
ogies  become  available.  Following  the
putty-clay approach,  a farm  may  contin-
ue  operating  with its  existing  technology
or incur costs of investment  ks in adopting
a new technology  s,  s  =  So +  1,.  .,  S,  (for
simplicity,  assume  k,  =  0 for  s  =  1,  . .
So). 3 The cost of new technological  invest-
ments  attributable to the present  produc-
tion period is thus  yks where  7y  reflects the
cost of capital and depreciation  and, thus,
appropriately  "annualizes"  the  relevant
investment value.
Moreover,  following  the putty-clay  as-
sumption,  each  technology  is  associated
with fixed  input-output coefficients  which
may  be arrayed  in  an  L  x  J  matrix,  H,,
where  elements,  Hsej  denote  the  amount
of variable  input  e required per  acre  of
type j land using technology s. In addition,
each  technology  is  associated  with  a  1 x
J  vector  of  productivities,  ys,  where  ele-
ments  Ysji define the yield per acre on land
of  type j  for farm  i  under  technology  s.
And, finally, each technology  is associated
with a linear Capacity Constraint,  ~cAi  <
3 The assumption here  is that a farm  will only  incur
investment costs to adopt new  technologies  because
of  obsolescence  expectations  of  existing  technolo-
gies.
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bs,  which may be rewritten without loss of
generality  as
cAi  - 1 (4)
where  c, = (cl, . . , C 5 )  is a  1 x  J  vector
of constraint coefficients,  and  1/csj reflects
the maximum  of type  j land  that can  be
farmed with technology  s.
These  capacity  constraints  assume  that
different  land  qualities  require  different
degrees  of  effort  per  acre  from  a  given
configuration  of  capital  goods.  Thus,  the
maximum amount of land that can be uti-
lized  with  given  machinery  may  vary
across land qualities.  In addition, the con-
straint  implies  that  capacity  utilization
may  be  substituted  proportionally  be-
tween land types.
Assuming  a  competitive industry,  each
farm  regards  its  output  price  P  and  the
vector of input prices  V = (V,  . . .,  V)  as
given.4 Thus, with technology  s, total rev-
enue from the sale of production  is PysAi,
and  variable  costs  of production  (exclud-
ing rental expense)  are AsAi where ,s = VHs
is a vector of average  costs per acre. Sup-
pose,  also,  that the  land  and  rental  mar-
kets are competitive  with respect to  1 x  J
price vectors, W = (W1,  . ..,  Wj) and  R =
(R 1,  ..  .,  Rj) corresponding  to the various
land  types.  Thus,  the  net  investment  in
new land is WALi,  and net rental expense
is RZi.
Now  further  suppose  each  farmer  ex-
pects land  to appreciate and has a subjec-
tive expectation  of  land  prices  W*  at  the
end  of  the  production  period.  Expected
capital gains on landholdings  are thus giv-
en  by [W* - (1 +  O)W](L i +  ALi)  where  0
is the effective interest rate on the farmer's
land  investment  (including  opportunity
cost  on  land  held  free  of  debt).  In  this
context,  suppose the farmer has a myopic
objective  for  the  present  production  pe-
riod  of maximizing  his total gains,  7ri,  de-
fined  by  the sum  of short-run  profits  less
4 For  simplicity,  assume  that  input  prices  include
capital  costs associated  with operating  debt.
the annualized  cost  of new  capital invest-
ments plus capital gains from land appre-
ciation,5
i,  =  (Py, - y)A i - RZ, - yk,
+ [W* - (1  + 0)W](L, + ALi).
Finally,  to  reflect  the role of  equity  in
allowing  farms  to  capitalize  on  opportu-
nities offered  or encouraged  by new  pol-
icies  to  expand  landholdings  or  upgrade
technologies, assume that the industry does
not  have access  to  a  perfect  capital  mar-
ket.  Suppose  that  farms  have  different
credit lines available to them, possibly de-
pending on their equity, management,  etc.
Let mi represent  the total funds available
to farm  i  at the beginning of the produc-
tion period including both internal liquid-
ity  and  external  credit.  Fixed credit,  mi,
is a function of the initial net worth of the
farmer  and  the  composition  of  his  port-
folio.  It reflects  his ability  to finance  new
investments,  above and beyond  what can
be  secured  utilizing  newly  purchased  as-
sets  as  collateral.6 Then  the  new  invest-
ment in land  and alternative technologies
must  satisfy the Credit Constraint
k, + WALi  < mi. (6)
The  farmer's myopic  decision  problem
thus  becomes  maximization  of  rir  in  (5)
subject  to  the  constraints  in  (1),  (2),  (3),
5 Note that this  decision  problem can  be interpreted
as a maximization  problem  under uncertainty  with
risk-neutral  behavior.  Thus,  xri  is the expected  gain
at the end of  the period.  It  is the  sum of  expected
short-term  profits  less  the annualized  costs  of  new
capital investment plus expected capital gains from
land  appreciation.  Output-price  expectations  are
assumed rational and common across  producers,  re-
flecting  readily available  future  market  quotes  for
harvest  period  prices.  Land-price  expectations,
however,  due  to the  lack  of direct  information  on
inflation,  interest rates,  and  the like,  are presumed
to vary across  producers.
6Explicit  consideration  of  asset  composition,  debt
structure,  and the collateral  coefficients  of different
assets  complicates  the  analysis without  altering  the
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(4),  and  (6).  The  farmer's  decision  in-
volves choice  of a production technology,
the quantities of output and inputs includ-
ing land rental,  and land  portfolio adjust-
ment.  For conceptual  purposes,  the deci-
sion  problem  may  be  broken  into  two
stages.  First, optimal production plans  and
land  transactions  can  be  determined  by
linear  programming  for  a given  technol-
ogy,  i.e.,
max  ~ri  (7)
Ai,Zi,ALi
subject to  constraints  (1),  (2),  (3),  (4),  and
(6).  Suppose the resulting  decisions, which
are functions  of  P,  R,  V,  and  W, are  de-
noted  by A*,  Z*,  and  AL*,  and  let the  re-
sulting  maximum  under  technology  s be
denoted  by  ri(s).  The optimal  technology
is then found  by maximizing  over  s,
max  iri(s)
sesi  (8)
where  ,  =  (s o ,  So  +  1,  So  +  2,  ... ,  S)  is
the set  of potential  technology  choices for
farm i. Let the optimal  technology choice
from the  problem  in  (8),  which  is  also  a
function of prices  P,  R, V,  and  W, be de-
noted by 7*.
Given  the  above  framework  for  each
individual  farm,  the  farm  responses  can
be  simply  aggregated  into  market  rela-
tionships. Each farm's output supply curve
for given input,  rental,  and  land  prices  is
y,.A*;  hence,  market  supply  is  XS(P)=
y'  A*.  Letting  XD(P)  represent market
i=l
demand for agricultural output  (XD'  < 0),
the market equilibrium  condition  is thus
XD(P)  =  :  yA*.  (9)
i=l
Similar equilibrium conditions can also be
developed  for input markets, but they are
not given  here explicitly,  since the results
in the remainder of this paper are derived
assuming  fixed  input prices  (elastic input
supply).
While  input  and  output  prices  are de-
termined  by  the  interaction  of  the  agri-
cultural  sector  with  external  forces  from
the  rest  of  the  economy,  the  prices  and
rental rates of land  are determined inter-
nally.  For  example,  for  given  input  and
output  prices  and  given  rental  rates,  an
individual farm's demand  for land of var-
ious  types  (supply if negative)  is AL*(W),
which  is a function of land prices accord-
ing  to  the  above  optimization  problem.
Supply  is  equal  to demand  for  each  type
of  land,  and  equilibrium  prevails  in  the
industry only if
I
S  AL*(W) = 0.
i=l
(10)
Similarly,  the  demand  for  rental  land
of  various  types  (supply,  if  negative)  is
given  by  Z*(R)  for  given  prices  of  land,
other inputs, and output. The rental mar-
kets are thus in equilibrium only  if
Z*(R)  = o.
i=l
(11)
2.  Subsidy and Acreage-Control
Instruments
Consider  now the role of agricultural
policy  instruments  corresponding  to  di-
version  policies.  Specifically,  consider  the
introduction of voluntary acreage  controls
and  subsidy  payments.  Suppose  a  farmer
has  the  option  of  either  diverting  or  not
diverting  a fraction,  1 - W,  of the land he
farms  (including  rented  land).  If  he  di-
verts 1 - w of  his land, he  receives a pay-
ment for  normal  production  on the  non-
diverted land.  Since the payment is based
on  regional  average  yields,  he  receives  a
payment of P per acre of nondiverted land
where  P  is  based  on a  payment  rate  per
acre  and  normal  average  yields  for  the
region.7 If the farmer does not comply and
7 The subsidy,  P,  under the 1977 and  1981 Food and
Agriculture  Acts,  can  be  measured  as  the  sum  of
deficiency  payments  and  diversion  payments.  The
diversion  payment  is predetermined,  while  the de-
ficiency  payment  is  computed  as  the  minimum  of
either  the difference  between the  target  price and
the average farm price or as  the difference  between
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diverts  1 - w of his land, then he receives
only the market price.  Let  Xi  be a dichot-
omous decision variable where X i =  1 cor-
responds to compliance with the diversion
program  and  Xi  = 0  corresponds  to  non-
compliance.  The  farmer's  decision  prob-
lem  for a  given  technology  choice  in  (7)
thus becomes 8
max  7ri(s)  =  [Py,  + PXie - s]  A, - RZi-  yk,
Xi,Ai,Zi,ALi
+ [W  - (1 + O)W](L i + ALi)  (12)
subject  to  the  Acreage  Setaside  Con-
straint
Xe[w(L, + ALi + Zi)  - Ai]  0  (13)
and the constraints in  (1),  (2), (3),  (4), and
the target price  and the loan rate or  price support.
Hence,  the deficiency  payment  subsidy is inversely
related  to  the  actual  market  price,  provided  that
this  price exceeds  the loan rate.
Producers  who  participate  in  a  program  are  re-
quired  to  divert  or  setaside  land  from  historical
acreage allotments  (prior to 1977)  or from "normal
crop acreage"  (1977 onward). This decision  is made
at planning  time after acreage  setasides  and target
and  price supports are  announced by  the U.S.  De-
partment  of  Agriculture.  Thus,  given  target  and
price  supports,  each  output  price  level  has  an  as-
sociated  deficiency  payment.  Assuming  the farmer
is  an  output  pricetaker,  consistency  also  requires
that  the  associated  deficiency  payment  be  treated
as given.  Of course,  for the stochastic interpretation
of the maximization  problem,  P is the expected  val-
ue  of  deficiency  payments  (in the  case  of  acreage
setasides)  and subsidy  payments (in the case of land
diversions),  and  its  distribution  is  assumed  to  be
known  to  farmers  and  determined  by  the  output
price  distribution  along  with  the  exogenously  de-
termined  target  and  price  supports.  These  unnec-
essary  complications  will  not  be  formally  intro-
duced.  Moreover,  to simplify the  exposition,  P will
be  referred  to synonymously  as  the  subsidy,  defi-
ciency payment,  or  diversion  payment.
8 Note that the trade-off  between liquidity  (as reflect-
ed by current  or operating income) and capital gains
is unity.  This simplifying  assumption  can be easily
relaxed  by introducing  a constant  trade-off  which,
however,  would not  alter the results  obtained  here.
Moreover,  liquidity preferences  for current  cash flow
may be  out weighed by more favorable tax rates on
capital  gains  (or  zero  tax  if  capital  gains are  "un-
realized").
(6) where  e = (1,  1,  ... ,  1)  is a  1 x  J  row
vector. 9
3.  Individual Firm Behavior Under
Diversion  Policy
In  the  context  of  the  above  problem,
the  effects  of agricultural  policy on  indi-
vidual farm behavior can be examined  by
comparing the results of compliance  with
noncompliance  using  the  formal  mathe-
matical derivations contained in Just et al.
(1983).10  Shadow  values  are  defined  for
each group of constraints,  b1 for the Land
Utilization Constraint,  2 for the Land Sale
Constraint,  -3  for  the  Land  Rental  Con-
straint, (4  for the Capacity  Constraint,  (5
for  the Credit  Constraint,  and  6  for  the
Acreage  Setaside  Constraint.  To facilitate
the  discussion,  definitions  of  three  quan-
tities  of  land  are  important:  owned  land
(Li +  ALi),  controlled land  (Li + ALi +  Zi),
and  utilized  land  (Ai).  In the  case  of  uti-
lized  land,  or  constraint  (1),  the  relevant
shadow  value is
[Py,  + PX  - ,  - 04iCs  - 06ii  >  0
1lji  =  if  A  =  Lij + ALij  + Zij
0  if  Ai  - Lij + ALi  + Zij.
(14)
Thus,  if type j  land  is  utilized,  its rental
rate is
Rj =  Py,  + PXi-  s-  04ic,  - ¢6iX(1 - o)  (15)
while, if  it is not utilized,
Ri=  06iXiW (16)
Solving  (15) for  4i,  the quasi rent to tech-
nology,  and noting that this rent measure
will  exceed  program  net  returns  [Pysj  +
P\i  - sj  - 06iAi(1  - ()]  less the rental rate
adjusted for the capacity measure l/c8, for
9A more realistic specification  would treat target and
price supports  as the control variables  and solve for
the deficiency  payment endogenously.  This  specifi-
cation,  however,  complicates  the  conceptual  anal-
ysis  without  significantly  changing  the derived  re-
sults.
10  This  paper  is available  upon request.
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all  types  of  land  which  are  not  utilized
obtains
[  F Pys, + PX  i  - i1
4  =  max  max  -
0 6
iX-  (1  -)  -)  R,  0  . (17)
Cs
If the first term on  the right-hand  side of
(17)  is  negative  for  all  land  types,  then
04i  = 0 and no land is utilized.  In the case
of noncompliance  (Xi = 0), (4i  is simply the
maximum  profit  (returns  to  land  minus
rental payments)  per unit of capacity over
all types  of land  controlled by the farm." 1
To further  interpret  04i  for the  case  of
compliance  (Xi  =  1),  note that  06i  <  (Ri  -
(pji)/c  for all j where  0,ji  > 0.  Thus,  06i  <
Rj/w  for  all  j. But the  diversion  require-
ment cannot be satisfied  unless some  land
is  controlled  but  not  utilized  (Aij  <  Lij  +
ALii  +  Zij); clearly, from  (16),  0i  = Rj/o  for
some  land type j and,  hence,
(18
06i=min  j.  (18)
Thus,  the farm will  divert only land with
the lowest  rental  rate.  The  shadow  price
of diversion  is the rental rate on diversion
quality  land,'2 adjusted  upward  by a  fac-
tor reflecting  the  proportional  amount of
land for which the marginal diversion acre
satisfies the diversion  requirement.
Turning  to  land  transactions,  the  gain
from either controlling or leasing  out land
of type j is equal to the market rental fee.
This result  reveals that land of type j will
be held if the expected  capital gains from
While  this  result  suggests  specialization  by  each
farm  in the  type  of  land  which  gives  the  farmer
the  greatest profit  per unit of capacity  (leasing out
all  other  types  of  owned  land  and  renting  from
others  enough of  the one  type to fill his capacity),
the equilibrium  rental market  conditions discussed
below lead to  adjustment  in rental rates which,  on
average,  tend to equate profits  per unit of capacity
on  all types  of land.
12 A land quality j  is defined  as diversion quality land
if it is at  least partially  diverted.
ownership plus the gains from controlling
the land  (represented  by  R,)  are equal  to
the  opportunity  cost  of  the  credit  con-
straint, i.e.,
>  -L,  if  W  - (1  + O)W,
ALjT  L  i  + Rj  =  ¢5i
Li  =-Lij  if  W; - (1  + 0)W
+ Ri < 05iW.
(19)
The opportunity  cost  or  shadow  price  of
credit may be determined from
05i  = max  maxw  -j  +  j  - 0,  0; (20)
i.e.,  if any land is held,  05i  is the expected
rate  of  return  on  land  minus  the  rate  of
interest.
The  above results on  rental rates,  (15)-
(18),  and  land  transactions,  viz.,  Wi -
(1  +  0)Wj  =  0iWj  - Rj for  held land,  al-
low a useful simplification  of the criterion
function  (12).  That  is,  substituting  these
results into  (12)  for  land types  where  not
all  land  is  rented  out  and  not  all  land  is
sold and  using  (18)  with  R = minjRj  leads
to
7i(S)  =  '4i  +  -XR  eAi
- R(L i + AL i + Zi- Ai)
+  ,siW(Li  + AL)  - yk,. (21)
Note  that,  since  L, +  ALi  +  Zi  - Ai  is  a
vector  of diverted  acreages  and R  applies
to  all  types  of  land  which  are  diverted,
the  third  term  on  the  right-hand  side of
(21)  is  R  times  total  diverted  acreage  if
fR  > 0.  However,  since  [(1  - w)/wo]eAi  is
also total diverted acreage,  the sum of the
second  and  third  terms  of  (21)  vanishes.
Hence,
ri(s)  =  04i-  yks  +  5siW(Li + AL)  (22a)
or,  since  either ¢,i = 0  or  the credit  con-
straint  in  equation  (6)  holds  in  strict
equality,  (22a) can  be rewrtten  as
ri(S)  =  04i - (7  + 05i)ks
+ 05i(WLi  + mi). (22b)
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Equation  (22a)  implies  that  the  overall
gains  for  the  farm  are  made  up  of  two
components, viz.,  04i  - yk,  represents the
gains  from  operation  and  05iW(L i +  -ALi)
represents the gains from wealth (in land-
holdings).
4.  Market Equilibrium Under Diversion
Policy:  The Case of Fixed Technology
To examine  the distributional  implica-
tions  of  diversion  policy  and  the  perfor-
mance  of  markets,  assume  initially  that
firms  do  not  have  the  opportunity  of
adopting  new  technology.  Hence,  every
farm  operates with its existing technology
s
o . Moreover,  for the sake of simplicity and
without  loss  of generality, assume the  ca-
pacity of each  technology  is  independent
of the land quality utilized, i.e., cs, = c,, for
all  si.  Finally,  the  total  amount  of  land
available of quality j is presumed  fixed  at
Lj.
The assumption  of fixed technology im-
plies  that,  along  with  a  fixed  amount  of
available  land  of  quality  j  [as  equation
(22a)  suggests],  land  utilization  and  asso-
ciated gains from operations can be treat-
ed separately  from landownership and  its
associated  gains.  The  component,  ks,  is
zero, and  thus the link between  landown-
ership  and  land  utilization  is  eliminated.
In other words, the trade-off between land
transactions  and capital  good  investment
does not exist. Given a perfect  rental mar-
ket,  the  optimal  land  utilization  will  in-
volve the  maximization  of industry  gains
from  operation.  This  can  be  shown  by
comparing the equilibrium conditions  de-
rived  from individual  firm  behavior  and
conditions  obtained  from  industry  maxi-
mization  of  gains from operation.
Firm Land-Use Equilibrium Conditions
The  key  determinant  of  the  equilibri-
um is the degree of  compliance.  The con-
ditions for compliance are summarized  in
the following  proposition:
PROPOSITION  1:  The  key  determi-
nants of compliance are the diversion pay-
ment per diverted  acre, [w/(1  - o)]P, and
the  minimum rental rate,  R.  Specifically,
for full compliance,  [w/(1 - w)]P  > R; for
partial compliance,  [w/(1  - w)]P = R; and
for no compliance, [w/(1  - o)]P  < R.
PROOF: Introducing  (18)  into  (17)  ob-
tains
PPYsj-s  - Rj
|+ Xi(P  - --  R)
4,  =  max  max  ,  >.  (23)
j,'Xi  C
Since  Xi  is a  choice  variable,  Xi =  1 for all
i  if P  >  [(1  - w)/w]R,  while  Xi  = 0 for all i
if  P < [(1  - o)/W]R.  Hence,  Xi  will be  se-
lected in  accordance  with the largest val-
ue of 04i.  The participation  decision is giv-
en by
i  f  P >  -oR
Xi(s)  1  if  PR
0  otherwise.
(24)
For P = [(1  - w)/w]R, each farmer will be
indifferent  between  compliance  and non-
compliance,  a result that will lead  to par-
tial compliance.
The case of no compliance is, of course,
of  little  relevance  to our analysis.  Hence,
we shall investigate the cases of partial and
full compliance for a given P. To examine
the  equilibrium  conditions  for  these  two
cases,  note  first  that firms  with  the  same
technology  for land quality  j are indistin-
guishable.  Thus,  they can  be treated  as  a
single  aggregate,  viz.,  the  total  land  of
quality  j  employing  technology  s  is  de-
fined  by
Aji  =-  Aisj
i
(25)
where  Aij refers to  land of type j utilized
by firm  i with technology  s. Since the ca-
pacity  of  each technology  is independent
of land  quality,  the  aggregate  defined  in
(25) is  constrained by
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where  Ns  is the number  of firms employ-
ing  technology  s. Similarly,  4 4s  =  04is;  and
since  ,4s  is the dual  value for the capacity
contraint  for  each  firm  employing  tech-
nology  s,
0(4s  S  ) = 0.  (27)
To admit the effects of diversion policy,
define the amount of land-type j diverted
as AO,.  Since  all the  land is  either  utilized
or diverted,
So
S  A,  = Lj;  (28)
s=O
and  similar  to  (13)  for  individual  farms,
the aggregate  limit on diversion  is
A,  < (1 - w)  Lj.  (29)
i  Ji
Thus,  using  Proposition  1 in  the  cases  of
partial and  full compliance  we  have
(1 ,h) Y, L.  - iT,  1dfp-,-W-~=n  (,o -/  Y  Y  i  )0j  I
To complete the staten
use equilibrium condition
into  (14) and  (15)  and us
of at least partial complia
oR  >- 0, to  obtain
Py,j-, 
+ P-  -
-I  - _y~  +  p  _  1-  -
A[  y.(-M.,+|P
version  is  treated  as  an  additional  tech-
nology,  i.e.,  the land-use  equilibrium  sat-
isfies
max S  S  (Pyj-  J)A,  + P 1 -
subject to the constraints:
Aj <  (1 - ow)  L
i  i
1
A,,  - N-  ,  s= 1, . , So
i  C,






The  proof  of  this  proposition  is  avail-
able in Just  et al. (1983).  The  proposition
shows that, while the decision problem  of
each  farm  is  a  discrete  programming
problem,  the  general  equilibrium  prob-
lem for a fixed technology  is a simple stan-
dard linear programming  problem.
Changes in  Diversion Policies
X  "J  v  ,,  Proposition  2 allows analysis  of the im-
pacts  of  changes  in  diversion  payments
lent of farm land-  and  requirements  on  total diversion,  out-
ns,  introduce  (18)  put, rental rates, and gains from operation
;e  the assumption  in the context of the simplified  linear pro-
nce,  P - (1 - ca)/  gramming framework.  In this analysis  an
explicit representation  of the dual to  (33)-
(36) will  prove  useful.  The dual  problem
Rj - 04,A  0  (31)  is
min  Lj j  i+  L  a,
'V
- o  .
+ a 0(  -w) t: Lj
j=l
(37)
- R  - 4sCs=  0.
Conditions  (26)  and  (27)-(32)  deter-
mine  the  farm  land-use  equilibrium  val-
ues  of  Rj,  ,  R  4 s,  and  A,j  (s  =  0,.  . . ,  So;
j =  1,  ...  , J)  for a given  P.  This equilib-
rium  can  be  easily  determined  from  the
following  proposition.
PROPOSITION  2:  The  farm  land-use
equilibrium (26) and  (27)-(32) for a given
output price maximizes industry total gain
from  utilization  and  diversion,  where  di-
5j  + ao,  >  Pyj  - ,j (38)
a6 + a 0 ,  P-  W
1  -w (39)
where  6j,  a , and  a0 are  corresponding
shadow  prices.
First consider the impact of changes  in
P  on  total  diversion  measured  by  T=
jJ=l  AO,  for  a given  P.  An  increase  in  P
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mal.  Under  partial  compliance,  this  in-
crease will result in larger diversion  while
under full compliance, of course, no effect
will be registered on  diversion.
The impact  of increased diversion pay-
ments  under  a  state  of  partial  participa-
tion  can  be  captured  by  the  use  of  the
dual representation,  (37)-(39).  For partial
participation  prior  to the  increase  in  di-
version  payments,  the  initial  level of  the
shadow price a0 is 0. Hence, from (38) and
(39),  it  follows  that  all  land-technology
combinations for which the return,  Py,, -
sj, is  smaller  than  the  payment  for  di-
verted  land,  Pw/(1  - w),  will not  be uti-
lized  (i.e.,  Aj = 0).  Given  a  nonbinding
aggregate diversion limit, as P increases at
some  point,  the  effective  diversion  pay-
ment, Po/(1  - w),  surpasses the  net gain
measure,  Pys  - Usj;  and  the  associated
(s, j) land-technology  combinations will be
diverted.  Such  lands  receive  a higher re-
turn  when  allocated  to  diversion  than
when  utilized  with  initial  technologies.
Note  that  utilization  of  these  lands  with
more efficient technologies is unprofitable
since, if the new  higher level of diversion
payments  were feasible and  profitable,  it
would  have  been  feasible  and profitable
as well as for the initial level of P. Finally,
if P increases but does not surpass any (s, j)
land-technology  combinations  for  which
the  net  gain  measure  is  larger  than  the
initial  Pw/(1  - co),  the  land-use  pattern
will not change.
An  increase  in  diversion  requirements
on  total  diversion,  T,  has  two  impacts
which  may  be  captured  in  terms  of  the
primal  (33)-(36).  First,  it  makes  the  di-
version constraint in (34) less binding; sec-
ond,  it  diminishes  the  gain  from  diver-
sions,  Pw/(1  - w),  the price  of  A0j's.  The
second  impact  has  the  same  effect  as  a
reduction  in  diversion  payments.  Hence,
if the initial participation is partial, an in-
crease in  1 - w will affect T only through
the reduction in Pco/(1  - w).  In this event,
total participation  and  the  amount  of di-
verted  land  will  decline.  On  the  other
hand,  for  the  case  of  full  participation,
both before and after the increase  in  1 -
w, total  diverted  land  (1  - ow)j  Lj  will
rise.  Clearly,  if participation  is  complete
prior to the rise  in  1 - w, partial  partici-
pation  may  result  after  the  increase.  In
this case, the  effect  of an increase  in the
diversion  requirement  on  total  diversion
is unclear.
As  with  total  diversion,  the  impact  of
changing  diversion  payments  and  re-
quirements  on  the  aggregate  supply  de-
pends  upon  the  degree  of  participation.
Under  full  participation,  given  output
price,  an  increase  in  P  will  not  change
land-use  patterns  or  total  output.  How-
ever,  under  partial  participation,  an  in-
crease  in P  may result  in the diversion  of
some  previously  utilized  land,  with  the
nondiverted land continuing to employ its
initial  technology.  Hence,  an  increase  in
P tends to reduce aggregate  output. More-
over, under partial  participation, a  rise in
diversion requirements has the same qual-
itative  impact  on  aggregate  supply  as  a
decrease in P; namely, output is increased.
On the other hand, if participation is com-
plete  both  before  and after  a  change  in
diversion requirements, an increase in  1 -
o will reduce total utilized land, forcing a
reduction in the utilization of some  of the
technologies  without  increasing  the utili-
zation  of  others.  Under  these  circum-
stances, total output  will fall.
Some  of  the  more  interesting  qualita-
tive effects relate to changes  in P and 1 -
w on land rental rates and farm operators'
quasi  rents.  For  full  participation,  equa-
tions  (34)-(36)  indicate  that the  new  op-
timal  solution  to  the  primal for  higher  P
will  be  identical  to the  original  solution.
However,  the solution  for the dual  for al-
ternative levels of P will differ. That is, to
insure  that equation  (39) will  not  be  vio-
lated, a0 must increase sufficiently to com-
pensate  for the increase in  diversion pay-
ments,  i.e.,
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Hence,  from  Proposition  2  we  find  that,
under full  participation,  an  increase  in  P
will not alter the industry production pat-
tern  or the  gains  or  quasi rents  from  op-
eration  (04s).  The additional  income  from
diversion  payments will increase the rents
for land. From  (40), these changes are giv-
en  by
ARj =  - AP.  (41) 1w-
In  the case  of  partial  participation  be-
fore  and  after  the  change  in  P,  the  fact
that  the  shadow  value  of  the  diversion
constraint  (ao)  must  be  zero  implies  that
Rj =  i,.  Thus, changes in rental rates Rj are
equal  to  changes  in  bj  in  the  linear  pro-
gramming formulation.  Recalling  that an
increase in P results in the diversion  of all
land  operated with  those technologies  for
which  Pyj  - u,  is  smaller  than  the  new
effective  diversion  payment, Po/(l  - a),
the change  in rental fees  will be  equal to
the change  in the effective  diversion  pay-
ment.  The quasi  rents  after  this increase
to the operators of those technologies that
were  employed  on  diverted  land  falls  to
zero.  For  land-technology  combinations
that continue  to operate  with the new di-
version  payment,  if  the land  is  of  diver-
sion  quality,  (38)  and  (39)  indicate  that
the quasi rent to the operator must decline
to  compensate  for  the  increase  in  Pw/
(1-  w).  Constraint  (39)  implies  that  3,
must increase  since  a0 =  0; thus  for  con-
stant Pysj  - gs,  some  elements  of  as  must
tend  to  decrease.  These  changes  will
spread  to  other  land  qualities  and  tech-
nologies;  therefore,  land  rental  rates  will
tend to increase  to absorb  the gains from
increases in the diversion payments, while
quasi rents will decline  to absorb  the loss
from reduced  production.  In  the  case  of
partial participation,  where the rise in Po/
(1  - w) is not large enough  to increase  di-
version,  as (39)  indicates, the resulting in-
crease will be reflected  in increased rental
fees for diversion-quality land with the re-
sult that, for other types of land, the quasi
rent will  decline accordingly  by  (38).
The  above  results  can  be  summarized
by:
PROPOSITION  3:  Given  output  price,
an increase  in  diversion  payments will  be
reflected  by  rental  rate  adjustments  such
that  all  increased  benefits  will  accrue  to
landowners  rather  than  operators.  In  the
case of full participation, the increased di-
version payment  will increase rental rates
leaving quasi rents unchanged. In the case
of partial participation, the increase in the
diversion  payment  tends  to increase  land
rental rates and reduce quasi  rents.
Proposition  3  implies that,  for the case
of partial participation,  increases in diver-
sion  requirements tend  to decrease rental
rates and increase quasi rents.  To examine
the impact of more stringent diversion re-
quirements  in  the  case  of  full-participa-
tion, the rental rate for this case  is
Rj =  6j + -.
()
(42)
Under full participation,  an  increase  in
1 - w will  reduce  the amount of  utilized
land; thus, some  (s, j) combinations will no
longer  be  operated.  In  these  cases,  those
elements of as associated with the discard-
ed  technology  are  reduced  to  zero;  and
since  Pysj  - us  is  given,  associated  ele-
ments of  j5  may result  in the reduction  of
other elements of  a, associated  with tech-
nologies combined  with  land  type  j;  and
this  reduction  may,  in turn, increase  still
other  elements  of  bj.  Thus,  the  reduction
in  utilized  land  due  to  higher  diversion
requirements  will reduce  quasi rents while
simultaneously  increasing  the  rental rates
for land through increases  in some b,'s.  By
(42),  the  increase  in  1  - co  also  tends to
increase  Rj  through  the  reduction  in  w
which  contributes  to  increases  in  ao/w.
However, by (40), the reduction in the ef-
fective diversion payment  will reduce 6 +
aO;  and  since  6 may  increase,  a0 will  fall
leading  to reduced  Rj.  In other words, the
reduction  in the gain from diverted acres,
[X/(1  - o)]P,  tends  to reduce  the  rental
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rate.  The  net result  of these  opposing  ef-
fects  is unclear.
The  implications  of  diversion  require-
ments  may be summarized  as:
PROPOSITION  4:  For  given  output
price  under  partial  participation,  an  in-
crease  in diversion  requirements  tends  to
reduce  rental  rates  and  increase  quasi
rents. Under full participation, more strin-
gent  diversion requirements  will result  in
lower quasi rents, but their effect on rent-
al  rates  is  unclear.  Reduction  in  utilized
land tends to increase  rental rates, but the
reduction  in  payments  per diverted  acre
tends  to reduce  rental rates.
A corollary  of some importance follows
immediately  from Propositions  3 and 4-
namely, an  increase in  P and/or  w under
partial  participation  reduces  as  and  thus
forces  some  technologies  and  associated
farms to cease operation.  Hence, some op-
erating  farms  included  in  N,  before  the
increase  will exit  from  the  industry  and,
thus, concentration  will increase.  That is,
COROLLARY  1:  An increase in  diver-
sion  payments  or a reduction  in  diversion
requirements  under  partial  participation
leads to increased concentration measured
by  the average  land  size of active farms.
The  above  results  presume  infinitely
elastic  demand.  However,  since  demand
for  the  final  good  is  not  completely
elastic,  it  follows  that  changes  in  P  and
1 - w tend to change output prices.  To be
sure,  the  second-order  effects  resulting
from price changes must be taken into ac-
count  when  the  overall  influence  of
changes in P and 1 - w is evaluated.  These
second-round  effects modify somewhat the
results  in  Propositions  3  and  4,  but  the
qualitative  directions  implied  by  these
propositions  remain unaltered.
Under full participation,  an increase  in
P  will  not  affect  output  prices;  and  the
results of Proposition 3 remain unchanged
when demand is negatively sloped.  Under
partial participation,  an increase in P will
increase  output  price;  and  that  increase
will offset the initial increase in diversion.
Nevertheless,  the overall  impact of an  in-
crease  in  P  will  be  to  increase  diversion
and  reduce output. This  is the case  since,
by negation, if the second-order  effect led
to  reduced  diversion  and  increased  out-
put,  ultimately  the  price  would  decline;
and  the second-order  effect  would be  re-
versed.  Similarly,  the  increase  in  output
price  resulting from an  increase  in  P  will
strengthen  the increase  in  rental rates  by
Proposition  3  and  will tend  to  offset  re-
ductions in quasi  rents.
Under  partial  participation,  when  de-
mand  is negatively  sloped, an increase  in
diversion requirements will reduce output
prices. This will partially offset the reduc-
tion in total diversion, the increase in quasi
rents,  and  the  reduction  in  rental  rates.
However,  the  overall  results  implied  by
Proposition 4 still hold for this case. Under
full participation, an increase  in diversion
requirements  will  increase  output  prices.
The second-order  effects will be  increases
in  quasi rents and rental  rates.
Cost-Reducing Technologies
The  equilibrium  level  of  diversion,
rental rates, and quasi rents can be deter-
mined  graphically  for  the  special  case
where  land  productiveity  is  independent
of technology  (ysj = y)  and the cost of each
technology  is independent of land quality
(Usj  = As).  The dual, (37)-(39), indicates that
in this case there  will be  a critical j* such
that all types  of land with higher produc-
tivity  (yj  >  j,*)  will be utilized, while low-
er  productivity  lands  (yj  < yj,)  will  not.
There  also will be  a marginal  technology,
s*,  such that all the lower cost technologies
(As*  >  As)  will  be fully  utilized  (hereafter
referred  to  as  efficient  technologies)  and
all  the  less-efficient  technologies  will  not
be  utilized.  Moreover,  by  the  indepen-
dence of land  productivity  and  technolo-
gy, a unique correspondence  between land
quality types and technologies  will not ex-
ist. For the optimal solution, diverted lands
may  be  utilized  with  any  efficient  tech-
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nology.  Only the optimal level of total di-
version is captured; this total diversion de-
termines  the  marginal  land  quality,  sj*,
and  the  marginal  technology,  ,S*,  along
with their utilization levels.  In Figure l(a),
qualities  of land  are arrayed  by declining
quality  along the land axis with total rev-
enues  per  acre  shown  in  the  upper  bar
graph.  Existing technology  capacities  are
also arrayed along the land axis by declin-
ing efficiency  with operating  costs per acre
shown in the lower bar graph. Subtracting
operating costs from revenues allows gains
from operation, Py, - Fs, to be determined
as  shown  in  Figure  l(b).  The  aggregate
diversion  requirement,  if all  farms  com-
ply,  is  (1 - w)L.  Thus,  if [o/(l  - w)]P  >
a,  all  farms  will  comply  since  the  diver-
sion  payment  per  diverted  acre  exceeds
the gain  possible  on  all land  to the right
of (1 - w)L.  If a > [c/(1  - o)]P > b, then
gains from operation exceed the diversion
payment  per  diverted  acre  on  the  land
[(1  - w)L,  La]  so that utilization  increases
to  La.  Thus,  from  Figure  l(a), all of land
qualities  3  through  6  are  utilized,  while
some  of the  marginal  technology,  So  - 3,
continues  to  stand  idle.  Now suppose  the
diversion  payment  is  lowered  so  that
b >  c/(1 - )P > c.  Then,  following  the
above  reasoning, utilization increases  from
La  to  Lb  so  that  all  of technology,  So  - 3,
is  utilized  but land  quality  2  is only  par-
tially utilized.  Finally, if the diversion pay-
ment  is  lowered  such  that  d  >  [w/(l  -
o)]P,  then  the  gains  from  operation  on
all land exceed the diversion payment per
diverted  acre.  Hence,  no compliance  will
result.
Since  any  land  utilization  pattern  con-
sistent with Figure 1 is optimal, the equal-
ity in  (38)  will  hold  for  j > j* and s  - s*.
This equality  implies  that rental  rate dif-
ferences  between  two  types  of  utilized
land will be equal to the difference in the
values of their output, i.e.,
Rk - R  = Pyk - Py  k, j  >  j*.  (43)






Figure  1.  Determination of  Aggregate  Com-
pliance.
utilized  technologies  will  differ  by  the
amount of the differences  in their respec-
tive  costs per acre, i.e.,
ts,  --  =  A-L5  - 'S1, S,  S2 
>
S*. (44)
As  Figure  1  illustrates,  two  types  of
equilibrium  are likely  under  partial  par-
ticipation.  In one case,  for example, when
b < Po/(1  - co)  < a, the marginal  land  is
fully utilized and the marginal technology
is  partially  utilized.  In  this case the quasi
rent  for the  marginal  technology  is  zero;
and  by  (38) and  (39),  the  rental  rate  for
the marginal land  is
Ro = Pyo  - a  > P-
1-ao (45)
In the second  case  the marginal land  is
partially  diverted,  while  the  marginal
technologyis  fully  utilized  [for  example,
when  c < Po/(1  - w) < b].  In  this case,
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the rent for the  marginal land  is equal to
Po/(1  - w);  and  the  quasi  rent  for  the
marginal technology  is  determined by
= Py,  - [/(  - [  )/(  l  - .P-  (46)
Cs*
In the case of full participation, the op-
timal  solution  likely  results  in  both  mar-
ginal technology and marginal land being
partially  utilized.  In  this  case  the  quasi
rent  of the  marginal  technology  is  zero,
and  the  rental  fee  for  the  marginal  land
is equal to the rental fee of diverted land.
Introducing  these  results  into  the  rental
rate  equation  for  diversion  quality  land,
we  obtain
R = Rj,  = w(P%, - +P).  (47)
Note  that  the  rental  fees  for  any  uti-
lized  land  quality  can  be  derived  by  in-
troducing the rental fee for marginal land
in  (44).  The  quasi rents for each  technol-
ogy  can  be  determined  similarly.  These
results  and  Figure  1  illustrate  the  use  of
Propositions  3 and  4.  Under  partial  par-
ticipation,  a  reduction  in  the  diversion
payment  per  acre,  Pw/(1  - w),  may  re-
duce  total  diversion,  the  productivity  of
the  marginal  land  [if  Pw/(1  - w)  moves
from segment ab to be], and the efficiency
of  the  marginal  technology  (if  it  moves
from be to  cd), while  production may  in-
crease.
The  effects  of  changes  in  effective  di-
version  payment on rental rates and quasi
rents depend on the segments  over which
such changes  occur.  If effective  diversion
payment  is  increasing  over  segment  ab,
only  the  rental  fee  for  diversion  quality
land will increase;  while, by (43) and (44),
other  rental rates and  all  quasi rents  will
not  change.  If,  however,  effective  diver-
sion  payment  is  rising  within  a  segment
such as be, (43)-(46) indicate that all rent-
al  rates  will  increase  and  all  quasi  rents
will decrease.  An increase  in effective  di-
version  payment,  which  involves  a  shift
from one  segment to another  (from be  to
ab),  will  increase  all  rents  and reduce  all
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quasi rents. If demand is negatively sloped,
the change will increase output price; and
this,  in  turn,  will,  by  (43)  and  (45),  in-
crease the rental rates for utilized land and
the rental rate differentials.
Landowner Distributional  Effects
The  above  results  related  to  distribu-
tional effects  on operators can  be extend-
ed  to landowners.  To  simplify  this exten-
sion,  a specific assumption on  the form of
land-price  expectations  will  prove  expe-
ditious.  Suppose  each  individual  merely
holds a  subjective expectation  on the rate
of appreciation  which  applies to all  types
of land;  hence,  W* =  (1  +  i/)Wj  where  ~d i
is  the  subjective  rate  of  appreciation  for
farmer  i.  Thus,  from  (20),  the  shadow
price  of credit for  individual i  is
Rj
05i  =  i -0  +-  (48)
Wi
where j is any type of land  owned  by in-
dividual  i  in  the  new  production  period.
If  individual  i  owns  no land  in  the  new
production period, then 45i = 0. Using (48)
and (19)  thus implies that each individual
will  own  only  land  types  for  which
Rj/Wj = maxkRk/Wk;  hence,  ownership of
all land  implies
R,  R2  =  R-- =  R
-WI  _  R=  2  (49)
Wi  W 2 ' ' '  Wj  W
via  the  equilibrating  market  mechanism
where  W is the price  of diversion-quality
land.  Thus,  (48)  becomes
R
0i - 0 +  W
05i
0




Using  (48)  in  (19)  implies  that  all
farmers  with  /i >  0  - R/W will buy land
until  their  credit  is  exhausted,  while  all
farmers  with  4i < 0 - R/W  will  sell  all
their  landholdings;  farmers  with  fi  = 0 -
R/W  will be  indifferent  to owning  land,
i.e.,
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f=
WAL, = mi  if  ti  > 0
w
increase  in  Pw/(l  - w) raises A  from  {P  to
fC.  From  (55a),
-WL i < WAL,  <  mi if  /i =0- w
WAL, =  -WLj  if  /i  <  0 - W
Thus,  a critical  A will  exist, viz.,
(51)
at the  new  equilibrium  where  R 0 and  R1
are vectors  of the  initial  and  new  rental
rates. By  (55b),
C  RoLŽI0  (O  - k )  mi
4,i::5  o  Oi  > ~o
such that all farmers with  4i  >  A buy land;
all farmers  with {i <  A will  sell land. The
critical  A  will  be determined  by the  land
market  equilibrium  equation  in  (10)
which,  when  premultiplied  by  W,  be-
comes
WAL, +  +  WLi  =  O.  (53)
Substituting  equation  (51)  in  (53)  and
using  (50) obtains
Z  WL i - WALi  =  mi.  (54)
Hence,  land  transactions  in the  marginal
group  with {i = A  must adjust  so  that the
total new purchase  of land by farms with
i >  / is equal  to their credit availability.
Introducing  (52)  into  (54)  yields
P'Li - (0 - °)  ~  m i (55a)
T  RLi >  (0 - c)  b  mi.  (55b)
oi---  i>~
Thus,  A  can be determined by  ranking {i
and  then  performing  tests  with  =  i,
i = 1, 2,...  .,  using R as determined in the
previous section  until a  /i is found  where
(54)  holds.  Note  that  equilibrium  is  ob-
tained  only if 0 - /i > 0 for some  i;  oth-
erwise, the  equilibrium  condition  in  (52)
cannot hold for positive  prices.
PROPOSITION  5:  An  increase  in  the
diversion payment  and a reduction  in the
diversion  requirement  under  partial  par-
ticipation  tend to increase land prices but
at  a lower  rate  than  rental  fee  increases
resulting from such changes.
PROOF:  First,  prove  by  negation  that
R/W = 0 - 4  may  rise  with  Pw/(1  - w)
under  partial  participation.  Suppose  an
at the initial equilibrium.  By Propositions
3 and 4,  R  >-  Ro; and, assuming  A4'  > flo,
I 
R Li  2; RLi.




Combining (59),  (58), and (57) contradicts
(56); thus, an  increase  in Po/(1  - w) may
reduce  4 and  raise  R.  To  show  that  an
increase  in  Pw/(1  - w) may  increase  but
never  reduce  land  prices,  note  that  the
possible reduction in A due to the increase
in Po/(1  - a)  will  cause  the  equality  in
(54)  to  be violated;  and the  only way  for
restoration  is for land prices to  increase.
5.  Technological  Adoption
In the context of the above framework,
what  are  the  major  effects  of  diversion
policies  on the  adoption  of  new  technol-
ogies?  To investigate this  issue,  the intro-
duction  of  new  technologies  must  be  al-
lowed.  In  this event the tradeoff  between
land transactions  and  capital good  invest-
ments can no longer be neglected.  Specif-
ically, the link between landownership and
land  utilization,  the  component  k,  [see
(22a)], is now  positive.  Necessary and  suf-
ficient conditions for the adoption of a new
technology,  sl, instead  of  So are that tech-
nology,  sl,  yields  higher  gains,  i.e.,  [by
(22b)],
rTi(Sl) - 7ri(SO)  =  04s,  - 04s
0 - 05iks,  >  0  (60)
and  that  the  new  technology  can  be  fi-
nanced,  i.e.,
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(O  - C,)  2;  mi -<  (O  - k  2)  C  Mi.
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k,  - mi-  WAL,.  (61)
As  implied by  (60), policy  changes will
augment  the  tendency  to  adopt  technol-
ogy  s,  if  the  new  technology  is  feasible
before  and  after  the  policy  changes  and
7ri(s,)  - ri(so)  becomes  positive  after  the
policy changes. Under these conditions, the
policy  changes  operate  through  two  dis-
tinct effects:  (a)  a quasi-rent effect  (an in-
crease in the difference,  44s, - ¢4s0) and (b)
a  credit  price  effect  (a  reduction  in  the
shadow price of credit, i.e., a reduction in
05i =  i-  0  +  R/W).
Condition  (61)  implies  that  policy
changes  may  increase  the  tendency  to
adopt the new technology  through  a third
effect,  viz.,  the  credit  availability  effect.
This  effect  is realized  if the  new technol-
ogy,  which  was  previously  infeasible  due
to credit limitations,  becomes  more prof-
itable and feasible after the policy changes.
The  overall  effect  of  diversion  policies
cannot  be  determined  unequivocally.
Nevertheless,  under  partial  participation,
Proposition  5  implies  that  an increase  in
P and a  reduction  in  1  - w will not  only
increase  credit  availability  (through  in-
creased  land  prices)  but also  increase  the
cost  of  credit  (through  an  increase  in
R/W).  Moreover,  the  increases  in output
price  and  rental  rates  resulting  from  an
increase  in  Pw/(1  - w) allows  determi-
nation  of  the  effects  of  diversion  policy
changes  on  the  quasi-rent  differential,
04S  - 04so,  since,  by  (23),
Pys, - jS - R,
C'
for  partial  participation  where  js  denotes
land  utilized with technology  s.
The  above results imply:
PROPOSITION  6:  Under  partial  par-
ticipation,  an  increase  in  diversion  pay-
ment  and  a  reduction  in  diversion  re-
quirement  will  affect  the  tendency  to
adopt  the  new  technology  through  (a)  a
positive  credit effect,  (b) a negative capi-
tal  cost  effect,  and  (c)  a  negative  quasi-
rent effect for a given output price assum-
ing  that  the  new  technology  has  larger
capacity.
Since  output  price  may  rise  when  Pw/
(1  - w) increases,  (23)  indicates  that  the
quasi-rent  effect of  Proposition  6 may be
reversed  when  the  modern  technology  is
yield increasing.  Thus, the direction of the
quasi-rent effect depends on the nature of
the modern  technology.l3 Therefore,
COROLLARY  2:  If  the  modern  tech-
nologies  are not smaller  in  scale than  the
older  ones,  an  increase  in  diversion  pay-
ment  and  a  reduction  of  diversion  re-
quirement under partial participation will
affect  the quasi-rent  differential between
the new and the old technologies such that
(a) the tendency  to adopt new cost-reduc-
ing  technologies  will  decline  and  (b)  the
tendency  to adopt  new  output-increasing
technologies  may  increase.  This  effect  is
stronger  when  the  demand  elasticity  is
lower.
The  second  part  of  Corollary  2  indi-
cates that diversion  policies,  which intend
to  reduce production  and increase  prices,
may  have  the opposite  effect  in  the long
run  since  they  may  accelerate  the  adop-
tion of output-increasing  technologies.  The
magnitude  of  the  quasi-rent  effect  de-
pends also on the characteristics of the ini-
tial  farm  technology.  Equations  (60)  and
(23)  imply  that  farms  operating  older
technologies  with  lower  quasi  rents  will
have  more  incentive  to adopt  than those
operating  newer  technologies.  Hence,  an
increase  in  effective  diversion  payment
which encourages  adoption will  generally
accelerate  the  scrapping  of  the  oldest
technologies.
6.  Concluding  Remarks
As  shown,  the  distributional  effects  of
agricultural policy can be distinguished in
13 The quasi-rent effects  of changes in Pw/(1 - a) are
perhaps the most important  since they  apply to all
firms and do not  depend on  their credit  situation.
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terms of three behavioral  units:  operators
(active farms),  landowners,  and  investors
in new  technology.  Introduction of  a  pol-
icy  in  which the  effective  diversion pay-
ment  on  diverted  land,  Pw/(1  - w),  ex-
ceeds the existing minimal rental rate will
influence  operators  by  decreasing  their
number (Corollary  1), increasing the min-
imal rental rate (Propositions  3 and 4), and
decreasing  the  quasi  rent  to  technology
(Propositions 3  and 4).  These  are the ini-
tial  effects.  The second-round  effects  re-
sult from increasing  output prices as a re-
sult of reduced supply. The minimal rental
rate increases further in the second round,
while the quasi rent to technology  and the
number  of active  farmers increase.  These
results  suggest  that  the  compliance  per-
centage  would  decrease  after  second-
round  effects.
The initial effect of the above policy on
owners is  an  increase  in  land  prices  with
a further increase in  such prices after the
second-round  effect  on  output  prices.
These effects,  in conjunction  with the ef-
fects  on  active  farms,  suggest  that  the
number  of  absentee  owners  will  initially
increase;  but  this  increase  will  be  tem-
pered by the second-round  effects on out-
put  prices.  In  other  words,  for  the  short
run  (with fixed technology),  the net result
of  increased  diversion  payments  and/or
reduced  diversion  requirements  is to  mo-
tivate  a  separation  between  operation  of
farm units and ownership,  i.e., an increase
in  absentee ownership.
For  technology  adoption,  a  distinction
may  be  made  between  operators  and
owners as  investors.  In the  case of opera-
tors, the effect of increased diversion pay-
ments  and  reduced  diversion  require-
ments is to increase rental rates and reduce
quasi rents to technology for both output-
increasing and cost-reducing  investments.
The second-round effects through the out-
put  markets  simply  augment  the  change
in rental rates while partially reversing the
change in  quasi  rents to  technology.  For
the  owner-operator,  land  prices  initially
increase and  are followed by a further in-
crease  once  the reduced supply  generates
a  higher  output  price.  This  change  aug-
ments  the  wealth  position  of  owners;  it
improves their collateral  and expands the
availability  of credit.  The expanded avail-
ability of credit, along with perhaps better
credit  terms,  provides  further  incentives
for  large  landowners  to  adopt  modern
technologies;  hence,  a high  correlation  is
expected  between  large  landowners  and
large-scale  technologies.
The  short-run  effects  of policy  on  dis-
tribution  and  equity  must  be  distin-
guished  from  the  long-run  effects.  The
usual conclusions  of static analysis,  which
suggest that producers are able to capture
the gains  from technological  progress  un-
der  diversion  policies,  must  be  modified
once  dynamic  effects  are  explicitly  rec-
ognized.  As  Corollary  2 clearly  illustrates,
under  certain circumstances,  increases  in
diversion  payments and  reductions  in the
diversion  requirements  (under  partial
participation)  can  possibly  increase  the
tendency  to adopt  new  output-increasing
technologies.  Ultimately,  such  technolo-
gies,  given  the  inelastic  nature of  output
demand,  will  lead  to  augmentations  of
consumer surplus as a direct result of such
diversion policies. Moreover, the short-run
effects  of  such  policies  enhance  credit
availability  and  thus  motivate  further
technology  adoption.  This  latter  effect
sheds  light  on  the  importance  of agricul-
tural  credit  policies  in capturing  the  ef-
fects of diversion policies.  In any dynamic
empirical analysis of agricultural policy on
the distribution and structure of landown-
ership in U.S. agriculture,  both credit and
diversion  policy must be examined simul-
taneously.
Some of the more interesting  results  of
this paper pertain to program  compliance
across various agricultural regions. In par-
ticular,  land  and  rental  markets  are  sep-
arated  by  geographical  boundaries  be-
yond  which  transportation  and
coordination  costs  make  farm  expansion
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unprofitable.  Hence,  the  results  of  this
analysis can be applied  to agricultural  re-
gions individually  or by groups. In partic-
ular, diversion program  compliance  tends
to be  greater  in agricultural  regions with
higher  costs,  less  efficient  marginal  tech-
nology,  and lower quality  marginal  land.
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